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This article grows out of my work as Assistant Director for Legal Studies with
the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavorial Research. I am indebted to a superb group of Com-
mission colleagues, including project co-director Marian Osterweis, legal scholars
Alexander M. Capron and Alan Meisel, physician Joanne Lynn, philosophers
Daniel Wilder and Allen Buchanan, and particularly to philosopher Dan Brock,
with whom I spent many hours in stimulating discussion and debate concerning
these issues. I am also pleased to acknowledge my continuing intellectual and
personal indebtedness to my teacher and friend, Jay Katz of Yale Law School.
Professor Katz's towering contributions on informed consent have made us all his
students; the influence of his seminal work on the ideas developed here will be
evident.
t Editor's Note: In recent years, both philosophers and legal scholars have written
extensively on the topic of informed consent to medical therapy. Much of this
literature proceeds from the assumption that the moral ideal and legal doctrine of
informed consent are, or should be, substantially the same. In this article,
addressed to philosophers, physicians and patients as well as to a legal audience,
Professor Weisbard seeks to identify several major disparities between the
philosophical and legal conceptions of informed consent, to explain why the "law
in action" has departed from the philosophical ideal, and to explore whether, and
how, the moral and legal norms for the physician-patient relationship can be
restated and brought into closer correspondence.
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Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an opera-
tion without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages.
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital (1914)1
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determi-
nation. It follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body
Natanson v. Kline (1960)2
[I]t is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for him-
self the direction in which he believes his interests lie.
Cobbs v. Grant (1972)3
[T]he patient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to re-
veal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses
enough information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of the physi-
cian's communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient's
need .... And to safeguard the patient's interest in achieving his own deter-
mination on treatment, the law must itself set the standard for adequate
disclosure.
Canterbury v. Spence (1972)
4
I. INTRODUCTION
Philosophers have created an enormous literature addressing the
themes of personal autonomy, self-determination, and, in recent years,
informed consent. 5 As these quotations from landmark legal decisions
make clear, this moral vision of informed consent is by no means for-
eign to the literature of American law.6 Justice Cardozo's classic
-statement of the right of bodily self-determination, articulated so
1. 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
2. 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960).
3. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972).
4. 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
5. Perhaps the locus classicus is J.S. Mill's celebrated essay, ON LIBERTY (1859). An
important recent statement is I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ES-
SAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). The contemporary bioethical literature is vast; see
generally T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (2d
ed. 1983); R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1981); R. FADEN & T.
BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986).
6. This article is conceived as a lawyer's response to one particularly elegant recent
articulation of the moral foundations of informed consent; see D. Brock, In-
formed Consent, in HEALTH CARE ETHICS: INTRODUCTION (D. VanDeVeer & T.
Regan, eds., Temple Univ. Press, forthcoming 1987). For a sophisticated philo-
sophic critique of recent bioethical writings on informed consent, see Shatz, Au-
tonomy, Beneficence and Informed Consent. Rethinking the Connections, Part I,




forcefully in the celebrated Schloendorff case, has lived on over the
ensuing decades to influence generations of judicial decisionmakers, as
well as authors of philosophical essays. His language has become so
familiar that today it is easy to forget that poor Ms. Schloendorff lost
her case.
Similarly, neither Mr. Cobbs nor Mr. Canterbury, the plaintiffs in
the best-known informed consent cases of more recent times, collected
damages for his injuries. In this crucial respect, the Schloendorff,
Canterbury and Cobbs cases typify the development of the law of in-
formed consent. Simply stated, the law has been far richer in its rhe-
torical devotion to the ideal of patient self-determination than in its
provision of effective legal redress to victimized patients. If the law is
to be judged by its success in implementing the moral vision articu-
lated by the philosophers-that is, in providing the competent patient
with a meaningful opportunity to participate in medical decisionmak-
ing on a voluntary, informed, and understanding basis-then the law
has substantially failed.
7
How and why has the law fallen short of its own rhetorical
promises, to say nothing of its underlying philosophical premises? In
this article, I shall argue, first, that in its attempt to translate the
moral ideal of informed consent into a set of workable legal rules
adapted to the technical requirements of the litigation process, the law
has transformed that ideal into little more than a legal "duty to warn"
of risks of medical treatment. This duty is measured not by the actual
informational needs of the individual patient, but by the hypothetical
needs of "reasonable patients" or by the prevailing norms of disclosure
of the medical community. While purporting to assure respect for in-
dividual self-determination, the inaptly named law of informed con-
sent has done little to "inform" the unique and sometimes
idiosyncratic needs, concerns, and fears of individual patients on
whose "consent" so much is said to rest. Indeed, one can plausibly
maintain that the legal doctrine has done more to teach physicians
how to practice medicine "defensively" (so as to minimize legal liabil-
ity) than it has to foster physician-patient relationships that permit
and encourage patients to participate actively and knowledgeably in
decisions concerning their care.8
7. For useful empirical reviews of how informed consent operates in practice, see
Meisel & Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent A Review
and Critique of the Empirical Studies, 25 ARiz. L. REV. 265 (1983); and the empir-
ical studies by C. Lidz & A. Meisel and by P. Appelbaum & L. Roth in 2 MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS (1982).
8. In this respect, my argument bears a family resemblance to Robert Rabin's argu-
ment that early tort law is better understood as a regime of "no liability" than as
a struggle between competing principles of negligence and strict liability. Rabin,




I also shall contend that the technical legal requirements that con-
stitute the current state of the law of informed consent do not provide
an adequate justification for the law's failures and do not pose insuper-
able obstacles to its reform. Rather, the law's failure to implement a
thoroughgoing commitment to patient self-determination reflects not
a failure of legal technique but a failure of will, rooted in a deep-seated
ambivalence among both legal and medical professionals toward the
reallocation of decisionmaking authority in the professional-patient
relationship. In closing, I will offer some tentative thoughts on the
implications of this analysis.9
II. THE LAW AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
Current American law derives from a number of sources, both
state and federal: constitutions, statutes, regulations, and, perhaps
least familiar to non-lawyers, the large corpus of judge-made deci-
sional law known as the "common law," which has evolved from the
decisions of English and American courts over the centuries. At least
until the past decade,lO the law of informed consent had been almost
9. Limitations of space necessarily constrain the scope of this discussion and require
a certain amount of simplification of complex legal issues. For fuller treatment
of the themes addressed herein, see J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND
PATIENT (1984), a compelling book-length analysis of the historical, moral, legal
and psychological foundations of informed consent and the physician-patient re-
lationship. See also J. KATZ & A.M. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DE-
CIDES WHAT? (1975); R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS (1979). Among the
many outstanding articles in the extensive legal literature are: Capron, Informed
Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340
(1974); Goldstein, For Harold Lasswel: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, En-
trapmen Informed Consen and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683 (1975); Katz,
Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Katz, Law's Vision] (an account strongly influential on the
views presented here); Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for Medical Accidents:
From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REV.
51 (1977); Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a
Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L.
REv. 413. The classic article by Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Ther-
apy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1970), played an influential role in shaping several of
the judicial decisions discussed herein and deserves close attention. See also the
three volume report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, MAKING HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS (1982), and the many additional sources cited therein. Two addi-
tional major studies appeared following the completion of this article: R. FADEN
& T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986); Shultz,
From Informed Consent to Patient Chioice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE
L.J. 219 (1985).
10. In recent years, as a few courts have expanded the potential scope of physician
liability for failure to secure informed consent, several state legislatures (often
acting at the behest of medical societies) have enacted legislation to define (and
usually to restrict) such liability. See 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra
note 9, at app. L.
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entirely a creature of this common law process. In order to under-
stand the historical development and current status of the law of in-
formed consent, it is necessary to explore, albeit briefly, certain
characteristics of this process.
A. The Common Law Context
As Tocqueville keenly observed a century and a half ago, judicial
power in the United States "pronounces on special cases, and not upon
general principles."' 1 That is, judges are not philosopher-kings for the
American Republic, granted roving commissions to pronounce upon
all matters of general concern. Rather, the judicial office is confined
to the resolution of concrete cases and controversies between individ-
ual litigants with tangible stakes in the outcome of the litigation. In
deciding the particular cases that come before them, common law
judges articulate the applicable legal principles (derived primarily
from precedents established in prior cases, as well as from applicable
statutes and regulations) and apply them to the facts of the particular
case. Such applications of law to facts give greater specificity to the
governing principles and create new precedents applicable to future
cases. It is through this process that the law continually clarifies and
refines legal rules of conduct.
In contrast to philosophical arguments, which may proceed in logi-
cal fashion from initial principles to a comprehensive and internally
consistent theory, the law progresses in fits and starts, depending on
the nature of the questions presented by individual cases and, perhaps,
even on the order in which cases arise. The current law of informed
consent strongly reflects the influence of this process.
B. Characteristics of Informed Consent Cases
Consider the factors that influence whether a dispute will go to
court for resolution. Litigation is enormously expensive in terms of
money, time and energy. Few potential plaintiffs, and perhaps even
fewer plaintiffs' lawyers, are prepared to invest substantial resources
purely over "a matter of principle," for example, to win judicial recog-
nition that a given physician has infringed upon the patient's right of
self-determination. The harm, which lawyers refer to as a dignitary
injury, is generally too abstract and intangible to result in a damage
award large enough to justify the lawsuit.12 Enthusiasm for going to
11. 1 A. DETOcQuEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERIcA 99 (P. Bradley, ed. 1946) (orig.
trans. H. Reeve, New York 1838).
12. Indeed, in malpractice actions, the plaintiffs inability to prove "real" damages-
beyond a dignitary harm-will generally result in dismissal of the lawsuit (ex-
cept, perhaps, in certain cases of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress). While proof of damage is generally not required in battery actions as a
1986]
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court tends to be keener when the smell of money is in the air, such as
when the plaintiff has suffered serious physical injury and a jury may
be inclined to provide the injured patient (and the patient's lawyer)'3
with a large financial recovery.
For these pragmatic (if not morally uplifting) reasons, almost all
cases arising from medical mishaps are brought by patients who have
sustained serious medical injuries and are seeking substantial dam-
ages. The law does not permit recovery merely on the basis that the
injury occurred and the patient is thought "deserving" of compensa-
tion. Physicians are not required to "act at their peril," assuming legal
and financial responsibility for every failure to achieve optimal re-
sults. Rather, a specific basis for the physician's liability must be es-
tablished.14 Recovery is generally precluded when the risk of harm is
matter of legal theory, in practice such actions are rarely brought, for the reasons
elaborated in the text. See infra note 14.
13. Under the contingency fee system generally in effect in medical malpractice liti-
gation, the plaintiff's lawyer is compensated with a percentage of the plaintiff's
recovery. The larger the recovery, the larger the lawyer's fee. If the plaintiff
receives a small award or loses, the lawyer receives little or no compensation for
his or her services. As might be expected, this system does not encourage lawyers
to undertake cases over matters of principle, unless fees can be paid on some
other basis or from some other source. See infra note 33.
14. Although a few commentators have favored the adoption of non-fault-based com-
pensation for medical injuries, and a few judges have made very tentative steps in
this direction (see, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974)
(Utter, J., concurring); Clark v. Gibbons, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125,426 P.2d 525,535 (1967)
(Tobriner, J., concurring); cf. Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379
(1977)), the legal system to date requires an injured patient to prove "fault" by
the physician to justify a recovery. Fault may encompass either intentional or
negligent misconduct. Depending on the jurisdiction, a medical procedure per-
formed without the patient's informed consent (absent emergency circumstances
or certain other excuses or justifications) may be classed as either a battery (an
unconsented touching) or an instance of negligent malpractice.
A number of important practical consequences may flow from this distinction
between legal theories. As previously observed, the requirement that physical
injury be proved as a prerequisite to recovery applies to negligence but not to
battery actions. See supra note 12. There may also be important differences in
the applicable statutes of limitations. And there may be differences in the types
of medical procedures to which the theories apply. In a surprising decision, at
least one jurisdiction following the battery approach has limited the scope of in-
formed consent to procedures involving direct physical touching (e.g., surgery),
thereby excluding such medical procedures as drug therapy or psychoanalysis.
See Malloy v. Shanahan, 280 Pa. Super. 440, 421 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); see
also Boyer v. Smith, 345 Pa. Super. 66, 497 A.2d 646 (Pa. Super Ct. 1985).
A full discussion of the tangled relationship between battery and malpractice
theories of informed consent is beyond the scope of this article. For a more ex-
tended treatment, see Capron, supra note 9 at 404 (arguing, inter alia, for the
creation of a "hybrid of negligence and battery theories that is controlled by its
own logic and is not confined by the rules which attach to either of its parent
causes of action") and 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 9, at 21-22
and the sources cited therein.
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inherent in the medical treatment, the treatment is skillfully adminis-
tered, and the patient was apprised of the risks and consented to the
treatment.
Traditional medical malpractice claims focus on the question of
whether diagnosis and treatment were skillfully performed. If plain-
tiff can prove that the physician was negligent and that this negligence
actually and proximately caused the plaintiff's injury, there may be a
basis for recovery. But these claims, even if well-founded, are often
difficult to prove, due not least to the difficulty some plaintiffs have
encountered in enlisting expert medical witnesses to testify against
their medical colleagues (the "conspiracy of silence"). For this reason
informed consent claims are often "tacked on" to malpractice cases; if
the plaintiff cannot persuade the jury that the physician was negligent
in treatment, perhaps the case can be redeemed by proving that the
physician failed to warn the patient of the risk of injury.
C. The Centrality of Disclosure of Risks
For the reasons just discussed, the brute fact of a serious injury
typically looms over the trial of an informed consent case. Whatever
the theoretical legal basis for the claim, attention is riveted on the par-
ticular risk that did materialize in injury. At trial, several fundamen-
tal questions are presented. First, should the risk have been
disclosed? However remote a given risk appeared in prospect, hind-
sight demonstrates that it was sufficiently "real" that it could result in
serious injury-as it did in the very case. It is harder to focus at such
moments on whether other, comparable risks (which did not eventu-
ate in injury in the particular case) should also have been disclosed, or
on the implications of "complete" disclosure, both positive and nega-
tive, for the overall medical decisionmaking process. Second, was the
risk disclosed? The patient may testify that it was not, but is this a
sufficient basis for holding the physician liable, particularly if the phy-
sician asserts that he or she customarily discloses risks of this type?
What evidence will be required? And third, if non-disclosure is estab-
lished, did the non-disclosure of the particular risk cause the patient
to consent to a medical intervention, which then resulted in injury, or
might the patient have gone forward with the procedure even if the
risk had been disclosed? Again, what is a sufficient basis for such a
finding? Each of these questions illustrates the centrality of disclo-
sures of risk to informed consent cases as they are actually litigated.
Probably the most prominent and controversial issue in the evolu-
tion of the law of informed consent is the standard for disclosure of
risks. The traditional view, still adhered to by a majority of jurisdic-
tions, bases the obligation to disclose on prevailing medical practice.
The more modern view rests on a patient-based standard, set by law
rather than by medical custom. In either case, the standards articu-
1986]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
lated by the courts would seem not to require disclosure of commonly
appreciated, insubstantial, or very remote risks of injury. Yet, perhaps
for the reasons we have seen, physicians have been reluctant to place
much credence in these assurances. One physician's lament is
illustrative:
The situation is hardly clarified by the remarkably condescending verbiage of
Cobbs v. Grant. "The patient's interest in information does not extend to a
lengthy polysyllabic discourse on all possible complications. A mini-course in
medical science is not required .... " The unspoken corollary to this, of
course, is that the physician had better have informed his patient of the com-
plication that actually did occur, even if the statistical probabilities were
minuscule.1 5
Whether or not this perception is accurate in terms of legal theory
or practice, the perception appears to be widespread within the medi-
cal community. This apprehension has resulted in some physicians
feeling a need to disclose virtually all conceivable risks associated with
treatment. These perceived "requirements," in addition to their often
criticized burdensome quality to physicians, can lead to a formalistic
recitation of a near-endless parade of risks so mind-numbing (and per-
haps so frightening) as to overwhelm the patient's capacity to assimi-
late significant information.6 The law's concern with risk disclosure,
as it is (mis)understood and put into practice, may defeat rather than
enhance the patient's capacity to utilize significant information to
make sound decisions.
A further consequence of the law's focus on disclosure of risks has
been the need to document disclosures. For understandable reasons,
courts have been reluctant to encourage swearing contests between
physicians and patients regarding what was disclosed, and physicians
have come to loathe resting their potential liability on a jury's evalua-
tion of that contest. Hence, the rise of the now ubiquitous "informed
consent form." Increasingly, these forms are being commercially pre-
pared and distributed, rather than being individually tailored by the
treating physician to the informational needs and educational level of
the particular patient. There is growing reason for concern that con-
15. Laforet, The Fiction of Informed Consent, 235 J.A.M.A. 1579, 1580 (1976) (empha-
sis in original). See also Ingelfinger, Informed (but Uneducated) Consent, 287
NEW ENG. J. MED. 465 (1972). But see Precourt v. Frederick, 395 Mass. 689, 481
N.E.2d 1144 (1985) (overturning a substantial jury verdict on grounds that even a
severe consequence does not "require disclosure if the chance of the consequence
occurring was so remote as to be negligible," id. at 695, 481 N.E.2d at 1149, and
that failure to provide adequate evidence of the likelihood of the risk would pre-
clude submission to the jury, even in a patient materiality jurisdiction).
Precourt's result, although not all aspects of its relatively skimpy analysis, is fa-
vorably reviewed in Curran, Informed Consent in Malpractice Cases: A Turn To-
ward Reality, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 429 (1986).
16. See Epstein and Lasagna, Obtaining Informed Consent. Form and Substance, 123
ARCH. INT. MED. 682 (1969).
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sent forms are becoming substitutes for, rather than documentary evi-
dence of, an ongoing process of disclosure, discussion, and
decisionmaking between physician and patient. If physicians come to
believe (often incorrectly)17 that their obligation to obtain the pa-
tient's informed consent can be satisfied by securing a signature-even
that of a drowsy, drugged, or confused patient on an abstruse, jargon-
ridden, and largely unintelligible preprinted consent form-the law's
reliance on written documentation may come to pervert its central
purpose in requiring informed consent.
A corollary of the law's disproportionate focus on disclosure of par-
ticular risks has been its relative indifference to the overall quality of
the communicative relationship between physician and patient. This
includes the subtle interactions through which the physician may en-
hance or retard the patient's ability to participate effectively in the
process of discussion and decisionmaking. The law has done little or
nothing to encourage the physician to talk with, rather than at, the
patient; to elicit and respond to the patient's unexpressed fears, con-
cerns, confusions, and questions; or to take positive steps to enhance
the patient's ability to participate effectively in the decisionmaking
process. The physician who punctiliously recites the litany of poten-
tial risks and secures the patient's signature on the proper form, but
who fails even to attempt to engage the patient as a person in the deci-
sionmaking process at more than this superficial level, may well be
legally protected. One may wonder whether this legal "duty to dis-
close," although clearly easier to enforce than standards rooted in the
patient's level of comprehension or the still more subtle quality of the
communications process, bears much resemblance to the professed
objectives of patient self-determination that informed consent is said
to serve.
D. The Law's Technical Requirements
For many generations, lawyers, courts and other observers of the
legal system have noted a propensity of jurors, when given the chance,
to favor injured plaintiffs over more powerful, richer, and perhaps
well-insured defendants. Out of concern for the integrity of their
truth-seeking function (and perhaps for other, less salutary reasons),
the courts have evolved a number of legal techniques to limit and con-
trol the jury's discretion in finding facts and applying (some would
argue stretching) the law to cover those facts. Some of these tech-
17. Under the common law, consent did not need to be written, and written consent
did not provide airtight insulation against liability. That is still the case in most
jurisdictions. Recent legislation in some states, however, has accorded presump-
tive validity to signed consents. See supra note 10. In such jurisdictions, a patient
may overcome the presumption by showing fraud, but might otherwise be bound
by a signed consent.
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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
niques can be employed to prevent a claim from reaching the jury;
others are reflected in limiting instructions with which the presiding
judge charges the jury.
These concerns are amply reflected in the technical legal require-
ments that an informed consent claim must satisfy to reach the jury
for decision. The plaintiff must allege and prove that the physician
violated a legally established duty to disclose a particular risk, that the
undisclosed risk materialized in a physical injury,1 8 and that the fail-
ure to disclose "caused" the patient to consent to a procedure which
otherwise would have been rejected. These requirements are not
unique to informed consent claims; they bear close relationship to the
general requirements for other tort actions, particularly including
medical malpractice actions. Yet as they have been applied in the in-
formed consent context, these requirements have tended seriously to
undercut the law's ability to promote patient self-determination.
While a full review of these issues is outside the scope of this arti-
cle, an analysis of the closely related legal requirements of materiality
and causation will illustrate the problem. These requirements call for
determinations, first, of what facts would have been important to the
patient's decisionmaking regarding treatment, and second, of whether,
if particular disclosures had been made, they would have affected or
changed the patient's decision to consent to the medical procedure.
Obviously, these are matters as to which the patient possesses special,
and perhaps unique, knowledge and insight. On the other hand, in the
trial setting, the patient is necessarily called upon to provide specula-
tive answers to counter-factual hypothetical questions.
For example, the plaintiff might be asked, "if this risk had been
explained to you at the time, which it was not, and if you knew that by
consenting to the procedure you might be seriously injured, as in fact
you have been, would you still have consented to the procedure?" An-
swers to such speculative questions might well tend to be self-serving,
particularly when the potential for substantial financial recovery
rides on the answer. Not surprisingly, courts have shown a certain
18. This "materialized risk requirement" has been subjected to powerful criticism,
not least for its failure to "recognize that a citizen can be wronged without being
'harmed,' that his dignity as a human being has been violated .... " Goldstein,
supra note 9, at 691. The requirement also fails to recognize that an incomplete
disclosure may decisively and adversely affect a patient's choice among alterna-
tives, even when the particular risk that eventuates in injury has been disclosed.
For example, failure to disclose other risks (or other treatment characteristics)
which do not materialize can skew the patient's comparative assessment of alter-
native courses of action, thus resulting in an injury that would have been avoided
if full disclosure had been made and another alternative pursued. The law's fail-
ure to permit recovery in such cases further demonstrates that its primary focus
is on the physician's duty to disclose risks, rather than on any duty to facilitate
informed patient choice among alternative courses of action. This point has not
always been sufficiently appreciated.
[Vol. 65:749
INFORMED CONSENT
reluctance to rest important legal determinations on such speculative
testimony.
The law's treatment of these difficult issues is best examined in the
context of a particular case. Since Canterbury v. Spence19 is widely
and correctly regarded as the leading case in favor bf a more patient-
oriented approach to informed consent, its equivocations provide an
especially telling example of the ambivalence at the root of the law's
commitment to patient self-determination.
The Canterbury court, through much of its opinion, emphasized
the critical objective of assuring patient self-determination. The court
stressed that the informational needs of the patient should be determi-
native of the mandated scope of disclosure: "To be sure, the objective
of risk-disclosure is preservation of the patient's interest in intelligent
self-choice on proposed treatment, a matter the patient is free to de-
cide for any reason that appeals to him."2 0 And in an earlier passage:
"Optimally for the patient, exposure of a risk would be mandatory
whenever the patient would deem it significant to his decision, either
singly or in combination with other risks."2 1 In these passages, the
court seems to focus on the informational needs of the particular pa-
tient. Those needs may be highly personal -and perhaps idiosyncratic.
That focus is fully consistent with a philosophical conception of in-
formed consent predicated on respect for the autonomy of the individ-
ual. Yet a few paragraphs later, the court restates the applicable legal
standard as one which is "not subjective as to either the physician or
the patient; it remains objective .... ."22 That is, the risk is "mate-
rial" and must be disclosed only "when a reasonable person, in what
the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would
be likely to attach significance to the risk.., in deciding whether or
not to forego the proposed therapy."23
The Canterbury court follows a similar approach in its discussion
of causation. The court recognized that the "purpose of the disclosure
rule is to protect the patient against consequences which, if known, he
would have avoided by foregoing the treatment,"24 thus articulating a
personal or subjective standard. Ironically, the court then resolved
the causality issue according to an objective standard: "in terms of
19. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). A very similar analysis might be made of Canter-
bury's California twin, Cobbs. v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,502 P.2d 1,104 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1972). Both decisions closely followed the analysis set forth by Waltz &
Scheuneman in their classic 1970 article, supra note 9. For the seminal discussion
of Canterbury, strongly influential on the analysis suggested here, see Katz,
Law's Vision, supra note 9.
20. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
21. Id. at 787.
22. Id-
23. Id- (quoting Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 9) (emphasis added).
24. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (emphasis added).
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what a prudent person in the patient's position would have decided if
suitably informed."
25
The impact of adopting these objective standards of materiality and
causation is to replace an approach based on the needs and values of
the particular patient, however odd or idiosyncratic, with the needs of
hypothetical reasonable or prudent patients. This approach rejects
the centrality of the individual patient, in all his or her particularity,
and implicitly accepts the view that in any medical choice-making situ-
ation, there can be only one "correct" decision-not a range of possible
decisions, each potentially appropriate depending on the tastes, values,
and trade offs among conflicting values of the individual patient.
Thus, while removing the standard of what to disclose from the exclu-
sive confines of the medical profession, and focusing its analysis on the
informational needs of most reasonable or prudent patients, the Can-
terbury decision nonetheless fails to require disclosure to be calibrated
to any special informational needs of the particular patient. Nor does
the decision encourage the physician to determine what those special
needs are, or whether they even exist.26
Why this retreat from the implications of the court's professed
commitment to patient self-determination? The court provides a can-
did response. It rejects a legal standard predicated on whether the
"factfinder believes the patient's testimony that he would not have
agreed to the treatment if he had known of the danger which later
ripened into injury."27 In the court's view, such an approach "places
the factfinder in the position of deciding whether a speculative answer
to a hypothetical question is to be credited... [based] solely on testi-
mony of a patient-witness shadowed by the occurrence of the undis-
closed risk."28 It "places the physician in jeopardy of the patient's
hindsight and bitterness."2 9 This the court simply cannot abide.
Therefore, even in the decision regarded as signalling the high-
water mark for judicial respect for patient autonomy, the court's com-
mitment to self-determination is insufficient to overcome its resist-
ance to letting the finder of fact (typically, the jury) listen to the
patient's testimony and decide what that patient wanted to know and
would have decided if provided with appropriate information. The de-
cision is a step forward for those patients whose needs and values are
25. d2 at 791 (emphasis added).
26. The court's unelaborated references to reasonable or prudent persons "in the pa-
tient's position" may allow some theoretical leeway for greater individualization
within the confines of a formally "objective" test. Thus far, it appears that few if
any courts have accepted this invitation, although some have rejected the objec-
tive test in favor of an explicitly subjective standard, at least with respect to the
causal inquiry. See infra note 30.
27. 1& at 790.
28. Id at 791.
29. IM at 790-91.
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in conformity with those of the court's hypothesized "reasonable pa-
tients." This approach, however, does little to promote the choice-
making autonomy of patients who might choose to pursue a path dis-
tinct from that of the "prudent" majority. The Cobbs decision is sub-
ject to much the same critique.
Might the law surmount the technical restrictions of Canterbury
and Cobbs to realize more fully the promise of patient self-determina-
tion made explicit in the rhetoric of those opinions? A few courts
have made tentative steps in that direction, moving beyond Canter-
bury to adopt more individualized tests of materiality and/or causa-
tion.3 0 It is too early to assess how far those paths will lead and
whether they will be beset with the practical problems of litigation
that troubled the Canterbury and Cobbs courts. But with the advent
of the so-called medical malpractice crisis of the mid-1970s, the tide of
change clearly has been held back and perhaps reversed. While the
causes of that alleged "crisis" had little to do with informed consent,
massive lobbying efforts by state and local medical societies helped to
persuade many state legislatures to enact statutes reinstating pre-Can-
terbury "professional standards" rules for disclosure and, in some
cases, according presumptive validity to patient-signed informed con-
sent forms. The legal promise of patient self-determination was not
30. See, Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); McPherson v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 255,
287 S.E.2d 892 (1982). In Scott, the court generally adopts a Canterbury-style in-
formed consent analysis but rejects Canterbury's "reasonable man" approach to
the causation inquiry as severely limiting the protection granted an injured pa-
tient and as "backtracking on its own theory of self-determination." Scott, supra,
at 559. The court adopts an explicitly subjective standard requiring the jury to
resolve the causation problem "by examining the credibility of plaintiff's testi-
mony." Id. The court's holding on the scope of required disclosure is somewhat
obscure; while stating that "the scope of a physician's communications must be
measured by his patient's need to know enough to enable him to make an intelli-
gent choice" and that risk is material and therefore must be disclosed "if it would
be likely to affect patient's decisions," iC at 558 (emphasis added), thus sug-
gesting at least some element of individuation, the court does not characterize its
own holding on this point as either subjective or objective.
The McPherson court rejects the objective standard for determining the causa-
tion issue, on grounds that "no consideration is given to the peculiar quirks and
idiosyncracies of the individual," and that patient's "supposedly inviolable right
to decide for himself what is to be done with his body is made subject to a stan-
dard set by others." McPherson, supra, at 273, 287 S.E.2d at 897. The court adopts
a subjective standard for determining causation despite its expressed concern
"that the only evidence usually available is the plaintiff's bald assertation, tem-
pered by hindsight, as to what he would have done had he known all the facts."
Id at 273, 287 S.E.2d at 896. The cause of action adjudicated in McPherson arose
prior to the 1976 effective date of state legislation limiting the scope of informed
consent claims in North Carolina, thus restricting the precedential impact of the
decision even in its own jurisdiction. See Dixon v. Peters, 306 S.E.2d 477 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1983).
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achieved and, with a few exceptions,3 ' the law of informed consent has
largely stagnated since.
III. POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM
To recapitulate our progress thus far: we began with a moral vi-
sion of patient self-determination, a vision seemingly accepted by the
law and enshrined in its rhetoric. In translating this elevated rhetoric
into workable rules of decision, legal "craft" or "technique" trans-
formed the vision into a rather anemic legal duty to disclose certain
characteristics of the proposed medical procedure, particularly risks of
treatment. As understood by practicing physicians seeking to avoid
potential legal liability, these rules of decision were operationalized
through the use of informed consent forms, characterized primarily by
31. See, e.g., Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902,165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
In Truman, the California Supreme Court creates a cause of action for "informed
refusals" of medical care and rejects the contention that duty to disclose under
Cobbs v. Grant applies only when the patient consents to the recommended pro-
cedure. The court imposes obligations on physicians to provide patients with in-
formation regarding "all material risks of which a reasonable person would want
to be informed before deciding not to undergo the procedure," so that "patients
might meaningfully exercise their right to make decisions about their own bod-
ies." Id. at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
In recent years, the courts have turned their creative focus from informed
consent to so-called "right-to-refuse-treatment" cases, often involving decisions to
terminate life-sustaining care for incompetent patients. The courts have typically
based their analysis in these cases on a constitutional right to privacy, see, ag., In
re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), rather than on the common law
roots from which the informed consent doctrine has grown. But see In re Storar;
Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (viewing
the matter as one of common law and citing Schloendorffas a major precedent).
Perhaps in time the two streams of "informed consent" and "right to refuse
treatment" will rejoin, prompting closer attention to the possible constitutional
roots of informed consent doctrine and a fresh analysis of the basis for the law's
commitment to autonomy in decisionmaking. An important first step in this di-
rection was taken recently by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy, 98
N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). The court there moved beyond the strictly consti-
tutional privacy analysis set forth in its earlier Quinlan decision to base its recog-
nition of a patient's right to accept or reject life-sustaining medical treatment
explicitly on the common law doctrine of informed consent as well as on the con-
stitutional right to privacy. IL at 346-56, 486 A.2d at 1221-26. In the course of its
discussion, the Conroy court employed language that may well prove influential
in future informed consent litigation. Although the court is addressing a legal
context somewhat different from that of traditional informed consent claims by
competent patients, the relevance and import of the court's analysis is clear.
The standard we are enunciating is a subjective one, consistent with the
notion that the right that we are seeking to effectuate is a very personal
right to control one's own life. The question is not what a reasonable or
average person would have chosen to do under the circumstances but
what the particular patient would have done ....
Id. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229.
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their lengthy recitals of potential risks and by their general unintelli-
gibility to most patients. These forms are typically presented to pa-
tients for signature the night before the procedure is to be performed,
with limited opportunity for individualized discussion. So the law is
served, the physician is protected from legal liability, and patient au-
tonomy is "respected."
Might we have done better? Is this discouraging pattern the ine-
luctable result of the impersonal and technical requirements of the
legal process? Does meaningful, rather than merely formal, protec-
tion of patient self-determination simply pose a challenge beyond the
law's grasp?
I would argue that such a purely technical explanation for the
law's failure is neither sufficient nor satisfying. Particularly during
the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, the law demonstrated its potential
to be a creative force for change in American society. Many societal
institutions once thought intransigent to outside regulation (schools,
prisons, mental institutions) as well as other social problems (racial
discrimination, environmental pollution, consumer products safety)
have been subjected to legal control to a greater or lesser extent and
with more or less success by judges and legislators perceptive of the
need for reform. Is the physician-patient relationship beyond the
realm of such legal creativity?
While this is not the occasion to delineate in full an alternative
legal model for informed consent, consider the plausibility of a new
legal cause of action, which might be enacted by statute or perhaps
recognized by an innovative common law court.32 This new cause of
action would establish a patient's right to participate in medical deci-
sions on an informed, understanding, and voluntary basis. It would
impose an affirmative obligation on physicians to facilitate the pa-
tient's exercise of this right to the extent reasonably possible. Satis-
faction of this obligation would be measured by the needs of the
particular patient insofar as those needs could reasonably be deter-
mined by the physician, and assessed in light of the entire course of
medical care. Damages would be awarded by the tribunal (which
could be an administrative or arbitral body rather than a court) for
dignitary harms on the basis of a statutory schedule (e.g., $1000-
$10,000; perhaps more for punitive damages in unusual circumstances)
without any requirement that the patient allege or prove physical in-
jury. Provision might be made for losing defendants to pay reasonable
legal fees to prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys, to encourage the pursuit
of meritorious actions not justified by the prospect of large contingent
32. This model, while without any clear precedent, is not entirely fashioned from
whole cloth. Several of its features find parallels in provisions of California legis-




fees.33 (Tribunals might also be authorized to charge defendants' legal
fees against plaintiffs in cases of abusive or plainly meritless actions).
Finally, successful actions would automatically result in referrals to
state licensing authorities for consideration of appropriate disciplinary
action against offending physicians on grounds of professional
misconduct.
The point here is not necessarily to advocate adoption of this ap-
proach as a substitute for, or supplement to, the existing law of in-
formed consent. That would require a far more detailed specification
of the proposal and a careful evaluation of its negative as well as posi-
tive implications. 34 Rather, the proposal is raised only to suggest that
by viewing patient self-determination as a goal independent of the
avoidance of physical injury and separate from the legal apparatus of
medical malpractice, many of the technical obstacles discussed earlier
might be avoided or overcome. 35
If some such proposal for legal reform has merit, why has it not yet
been adopted? Here the law's failure to live up to its own rhetoric
seems to reflect not a lack of legal imagination or craft, but a failure of
will. That is, the law's commitment to patient self-determination is, at
best, ambivalent and equivocal. Those who shape the law are not yet
prepared to give full legal effect to their own rhetoric.
What are the sources of this reluctance? While any response is
necessarily speculative, one may begin by noting that lawyers and
judges, like physicians, are professionals whose own status, economic
position, and professional autonomy are rooted in a particular and
long-dominant image of the professional-client relationship. The
layperson's respect for professional expertise, deference to profes-
sional authority, and fear of the unknown are prominent features of
the legal as well as the medical landscape. Would it really be surpris-
33. A provision for fee-shifting would probably require specific statutory authority.
See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (upholding the
"American Rule" that a prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a
reasonable attorney's fee from the loser). For example, Congress has enacted a
number of statutory attorney's fees provisions, particularly in such public interest
contexts as civil rights and environmental litigation. These have been accepted
and applied by the courts.
34. A detailed proposal along these general lines, published after the completion of
this article, has been advanced by Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient
Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985).
35. The reader may wish to consider which obstacles would remain, and how they
might be handled under this system. To be sure, the financial recoveries would
be relatively modest. However, the set of incentives created for physicians, pa-
tients and lawyers might be more conducive to affecting physician behavior in the
desired fashion than is the current system. Further, these incentives would pro-




ing for lawyers and judges,3 6 as well as physicians, to be concerned
that a true sharing of authority between professional and layperson,
such as might be brought about by more vigorous legal protection of
patient/client self-determination, would undermine the foundations of
professional authority which have served them so well?3 7
One need not argue that professionals have consciously and cyni-
cally manipulated their esoteric crafts to undercut the professed goal,
under the camouflage of a fog of rhetoric. A far more subtle process
may be at work. These considerations may influence and shape the
world views of professionals at a less-than-fully conscious, subterra-
nean level. Legal professionals may thus be predisposed not to resist
too strenuously when the technical dynamics of the legal process, dy-
namics which are well known and comfortable to them and which
seemingly operate on their own force, lead them away from effective
protection of self-determination. Indeed, the complex interaction of
conscious commitment to patient autonomy with subterranean con-
cerns about loss of professional dominance at the individual level may
well be reflected in the contradictory, yet parallel pattern of the law,
in which professed adherence to the "root premise of thoroughgoing
self-determination" is undercut by esoteric legal doctrines which viti-
ate the force of this commitment.
If the law's continuing inability, or unwillingness, to effect a re-
structuring of the professional-patient relationship is rooted in a per-
vasive ambivalence toward the practicability and the desirability of
the goal, then it may well be time to rethink the appropriate role of
law in regulating these relationships. The quest for a legal "quick fix"
may indeed be quixotic, doomed to subversion by judges and physi-
cians, and perhaps by ambivalent patients as well. If change is to come
on a matter so fundamental, so tied to enduring habits, capacities, and
attitudes, it might well be argued that the pace of change must be
slower and more evolutionary, and its direction less adversarial. Such
36. The specter of liability in actions for lack of informed consent brought by clients
against their lawyers is already lurking by the door. See, e.g., Spiegel, Lawyering
and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U.
PA. L. REV. 41 (1979); Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 307 (1980); Peck, A New Tort Liability for Lack of Informed Con-
sent in Legal Matters, 44 LA. L. REV. 1289 (1984); Weisbard, Defensive Law: A
New Perspective on Informed Consent, 146 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 860 (1986).
37. One view of what is at stake is exemplified with unusual candor by a Wisconsin
judge who, although less given to clouding his deference to professional expertise
with the rhetoric of patient self-determination than some of his judicial col-
leagues, nonetheless gives voice to a rather common underlying sentiment: "The
writer has more confidence in the standards of the professional group involved
than in court or jury deciding what disclosures need or ought be made to a pa-
tient.... Children play at the game of being a doctor, but judges and juries ought
not." Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647, 659
(1975) (Hanson, J., dissenting).
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change, intended to reshape the professional consciousness of physi-
cians (and perhaps the consciousness and expectations of patients as
well), may come best through education, and not from law.
But where is the impetus for such change, and on what grounds
may we be confident that this evolutionary process will in fact occur?
Particularly with respect to professional education and training, can
we depend on medical educators-themselves steeped in the older tra-
dition-to serve as teachers and role-models on the path to this brave
new world?
Perhaps the appropriate role for law is found here after all. It is
natural to view law as a vehicle for providing relief to the injured and
for setting standards to regulate conduct. But law also serves a sym-
bolic or expressive function, giving voice to the norms and aspirations
of society. Indeed, as we have seen, the law of informed consent has
been rather more successful in this symbolic function than in actually
providing monetary damages to injured patients. Yet a cautionary
note is in order here: one must consider carefully the continuing vital-
ity of any symbol which becomes completely and permanently di-
vorced from the reality it is said to symbolize. Extreme divergence
between symbol and reality, like other species of hypocrisy, ultimately
invites contempt and disillusionment. That may not be far from the
reality of "informed consent" within the medical community today.
For both law and philosophy, the task of the moment is to articu-
late a vision of the physician-patient relationship that can serve as a
common, shared goal for physicians and patients alike. Neither the
traditional model of "medical paternalism," which rests on profes-
sional dominance of the relationship, nor the currently fashionable
mirror image of that model, "consumer sovereignty," which relegates
the professional to the passive role of a "body mechanic" or techni-
cian,38 is likely to serve this purpose. What is needed is a shared vi-
sion, attractive to both professionals and laypersons, based on mutual
respect exemplified in a shared commitment to define common goals
and to work collaboratively to achieve those goals.39
I believe such a vision would focus less on the events of disclosure
and consent and more on the process of promoting effective patient
participation in shared decisionmaking. In this process, the profes-
sional's role would be to engage the patient in a continuing dialogue,
38. See, e.g., Bayles, Physicians as Body Mechanics, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BI-
OMEDICAL ETHICS (J. Davis, B. Hoffmaster & S. Shorten, eds. 1978).
39. One such effort is reflected in a challenging series of articles by physician-educa-
tor Mark Siegler. See, e.g., Siegler, Searching for Moral Certainty in Medicine: A
Proposal for a New Model of the Doctor-Patient Encounter, 57 BULL. N.Y. ACAD.
MED. 56 (1981); Siegler & Goldblatt, Clinical Intuition-A Procedure for Balanc-
ing the Rights of Patients and Responsibilities of Physicians, in THE LAW-
MEDICINE RELATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION (S. Spicker, J. Healey &
H. T. Engelhardt, eds. 1981).
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seeking to elicit through conversation the patient's goals and objec-
tives, fears, hopes and concerns, and then to discuss the alternative
courses of action in light of both the patient's goals and concerns and
the professional's knowledge and experience. In such a dialogue the
professional would be no mere technician, but an advisor, confidante,
and colleague. Correlatively, the patient could reasonably expect to
understand the professional's recommendations and the basis for
those recommendations, while retaining the ultimate right of decision
(at least so far as rejecting unwanted therapies or procedures).
Whether this vision is best described by the term "informed con-
sent" is doubtful. As we have seen, that label has been applied, often
inconsistently and misleadingly, to a philosophical ideal, a legal doc-
trine, and an only partially (and often grudgingly) realized medical
practice. Perhaps the term itself has outlived its usefulness, and sur-
vives only for lack of a suitable alternative. But however phrased, the
ideal set forth here, of the physician's obligation to facilitate effective
patient participation in a process of shared decisionmaking, provides a
more compelling vision of the physician-patient relationship than the
current legal doctrine or medical reality that goes by the name of "in-
formed consent." It also provides a more promising candidate for
transforming that ideal into a reality.
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